Insulation scheme questions need to go much deeper

Few people would not be aware of the farce that has become of the Federal Government’s home insulation scheme.

But not many would realise that it has seen the insulation of some 1.1 million homes, which is no small achievement, irrespective of a few hundred dodgy installations by a few rogue operators.

According to the Sydney Morning Herald, the Total Environment Centre says that the scheme’s success equates to more than 15 million tonnes of CO2 emissions abated over 10 years, or the equivalent of taking 300,000 cars off the road. These are not figures to be sneezed at. If DEWHA had not screwed up the fine details of the scheme, allowing the Dodgy Brothers to get in on the action, everyone from Peter Garrett to Kevin Rudd would be crowing about the scheme’s success, and justifiably so.

It’s been hard to watch one of the best things that has happened in the sustainable housing field for decades become the target of such scorn, and like the media and Opposition, it has been hard not to start pointing fingers…just in some different directions and for different reasons from the mainstream blame game.

Anyone who has worked in a Federal Government department would be aware of the pressure public servants come under from time to time to whistle up a fully developed and costed policy in 24 hours. I’m not sure our elected MPs quite realise what can result from what might seem a simple request to an adviser, or even a throwaway remark in a cabinet meeting. “What’s being done for that in the regions?” says back bencher. “Put together a package that addresses the rural and regional cohort for that program,” says adviser to group manager, “and I’ll take it to the Minister tomorrow.” And the fun begins…

When staff want to float a new policy, they have to (quite rightly) jump through a lot of hoops, garnering support among peers and direct management, then up the line, until there is authority given to develop a New Policy Proposal. Then the work really begins. Some months later, the NPP has to jump through more hoops with Finance Department ‘experts’ in the field. And then just maybe your NPP might get an OK to be floated with your Minister, then Cabinet.

But all of that careful work goes out the door when the casual (or not so casual) request comes from The Hill.

People pull all-nighters, much of it gets drawn up by senior management who may not have the practical experience and history of the relevant line staff, risk analysis is the first thing to go. The proverbial ‘sow’s ear’ gets hoisted in front of the Minister, and before you know it, those previously ignored line staff are given said sow’s ear and told to make it work. Sometimes they can work wonders, other times they just do the best they can. And if the pressure is on for a quick roll-out as well, then the whole risk side of things gets magnified exponentially.

Policy on the run is seldom good policy, but the simple reality is that in Federal Government it always happens. So to the blame…

Government ministers and advisers should know that this happens, and that the pressure they put on for quick solutions will often result in poor outcomes that will in turn prove costly for the government – political costs, financial costs (entire departments being restructured or relocated because of cabinet changes) and (as we saw with the insulation deaths) personal costs. They should resist the temptation to want things urgently, and when things aren’t urgent they should be very clear when asking for them that people will be given some time to work it up properly – not months perhaps, but enough time to minimise risk and ensure that the solution proposed is workable.

Departmental Senior Executive Staff should have the gumption to push back on occasion. They should recognise the risks, make them very clear to the Government people making the request and do their best to get their staff adequate time to do a good job. Their staff, almost above anything else, rely on them to protect the department from ill-considered decisions and demands.

And staff right through the executive levels should recognise that this sort of thing is always going to happen, and they should plan for it. Every team has some downtime now and then. These are the times when everyone’s pet ideas and projects can be worked up. A smart Section/Branch/Group will know where the shortfalls are in their existing programs and policies, or areas where key interest groups are getting traction with their concerns. They will have a selection of reasonably worked-through policies and projects already drawn up to address those issues, sitting on the shelf gathering dust, just waiting for the right moment to fish them out.

So there are many people who contributed to the problems experienced with the insulation scheme – I just don’t think Peter Garrett was one of them.

Apart from Garrett, the big loser out of all this has been the environment. An amazingly successful program has been kneecapped, other related programs have been tarred with the same brush, and suddenly anything to do with climate change is on the nose.

And that really sucks.